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PREFACE
This study is an analysis of the emergence of the French- 
Canadian separatist movement. It is an examination of the causes 
and consequences of social change that contributed to the conditions 
of social unrest. The interactional processes (collective processes) 
are used to explain the development of the movement out of a state 
of social unrest and discontent. The scope of this study includes 
an analysis of the events in French-Canada* s history that were 
significant in the emergence of the separatist movement. The important 
aspects of French-Canadian culture and social structure are examined 
to provide an understanding of the nature of the existing social 
conditions•
Descriptive research is employed to interpret and analyze 
French-Canadian history, sociological studies of the French-Canadian 
society, news reports of significant events, and Canadian government 
documents and reports. The interpretation of these sources of data 
is explained in the sociological frame of reference for the study of 
collective behavior and social movements presented by Lang and Lang 
in their book, Collective Dynamics (1961).
In planning for this study, the intent was to rely heavily 
on primary sources of data, such as interviews, letters, and reports 
from English and French-Canadian contacts. Due to my inability to
iii
make the necessary visits to Canada required to accumulate sufficient 
data and the unexpected out-of-country employment of ray personal 
contacts, in Canada, secondary sources "became the main source of 
data for this study. However, not all was lost, since previous 
visits to Canada (Montreal and Toronto) and frequent contact with a 
Canadian medical team on duty in Vietnam during my tour there in 
1971 and 1972 provided a perspective from which to appreciate the 
biases of both the English and French-*’Canadians. Source material 
was selected on the basis of its objectivity and availability.
Special care was taken in selecting books on French-Canadian history. 
For example, Mason Wade*s French Canadians 1760-1967 (1968), was 
selected as a basic source for supplying French-Canadian historical 
data. Wade, not being a Canadian, is less likely to be biased in 
his interpretation of historical facts about the French-Canadians. 
Also, both English and French-Canadian historians and authors 
reporting research and studies about French-Canada and Canada in 
general have referred Wade as a reliable source. Wade * s history of 
the French-Canadians presents the history of both societies (English
j
and French) to the extent that the histories are distinct. Other 
studies and reports are accepted on the author*s/researcher's reputa­
tion. Most of the important news reports and stories were usually 
confirmed by reports of the same event by other news sources. For 
example. Time (October 1970) magazine and Newsweek (October 1970) 
reported details about the LaPorte and Cross kidnappings without 
any variation in facts. The Report of the Royal Commission on 
Bilingualism and Biculturalism. an official publication of the
iv
Canadian government, is accepted at face value as being an objective 
and reliable document (most of its statistical reports were obtained 
from census infoftnation)*
The primary concern in this study is to analyze the emergence 
of the French-Canadian separatist movement through the exposure of 
issues, causes, conditions, and social forces that are related to 
separatism and the French-Canadian society* And no intentional 
subjective statements are made in any description or analysis of 
events and conditions concerning the separatist issues in Canada*
v
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CHAPTER I
THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS OF 
SOCIAL MOVEMENTS
Introduction
The study of social movements is usually regarded as part of 
the subject matter of collective behavior and as an aspect of social 
change* The collective behavior approach emphasizes the interactional 
processes in the emergence of social movements* The aspect of social 
change emphasizes causes and consequences of social movements in the 
changing social order within which they arise.
The framework for the study of social movements articulated 
by the Langs (1961) in their book, Collective Dynamics, emphasizes 
a "collective behavior" approach. However, the importance of social 
change in relation to social movements is not denigrated by their
j
emphasis on collective behavior* The Langs strongly underscore the 
relationship of collective behavior to ultimate change in the larger 
social order. The social action identified with a social movement 
is continuous and directed toward pervasive changes in the social 
order.
On the other hand, Gusfield (I970i 7)$ in outlining the 
categories in his approach to the study of social movements, discounts 
elementary collective behavior as a viable concept for examining
2social movements within the context of social conflict and social 
change. Gusfield's approach stresses the analysis of change and 
social conflict. He views social movements as structured collective 
action demanding changes in the system or the social order. The rela­
tionship of collective behavior to social movements is recognized, 
but he gives more importance, to the organized aspects of social 
movements. Gusfield uses several examples of elementary collective 
behavior to highlight the weakness in this concept to explain change 
and social conflict.'*
A crowd at a baseball game may riot, as sports audiences 
have been known to do when enraged at a decision. The 
outbreak of fire may create panic in a public building.
An audience at a theater is analyzable as a sporadic and 
highly suggestible group. Such behavior, however, has 
little significance for the system of rules and relation­
ships we call social orders. None of these contributes 
to an understanding of conflicts and changes in society 
(Gusfield, 19?0i 7).
Indeed, this behavior, as presented, has little significance for
the social order, nor. does it contribute to an understanding of
conflicts and changes in society. These events are isolated, they
are not related to a "spirit" for change, and there are no deep and
vital social causes at issue. However, events like these could be
significant. The significance of collective behavior to the study
of social movements becomes obvious when "real" issues are used in
Gusfield*s brief scenarios of elementary collective behavior. Events
p
from the French-Canadian separatist movement are used in the following 
examples*
A crowd at a hockey game riots when a French-Canadian 
hockey hero is suspended by the hockey league's president, 
an English-Canadlan. Panic is created as a result of
terrorist bomb threats* A French-Canadian audience viewing the 
film, Les Ordes (a "fictional documentary” on the experiences of 
French-Canadians arrested and detained under the 1970 War 
Measures Act), would be a more suggestible group than they 
would be if they were viewing Blanche Neige et Les Sent Nalns 
(Snow White and the Seven Dwarfs).
These events contribute to a better understanding of 
collective behavior, social movements, and social change when the 
question, "Why the event occurred?” as well as, "What event Occurred?” 
is asked. The form of behavior has little if any significance for 
change or the social order until it is connected to a socially 
shared cause vital to society. .
The analysis of the French-Canadian separatist movement in 
this paper is done within the framework of elementary collective 
behavior and through examining the causes and consequences of social 
change in relation to the separatist movement.
The Nature of Social Movements
When the organizational aspect of social movements is 
stressed, there is a tendency to mix social movements and voluntary 
associations. From an organizational aspect, a social movement lies 
somewhere between the associations and mass behavior. The associa­
tions, such as political parties, or pressure groups, are character­
ized by an organizational structure, clear boundaries and stable 
functions. Mass behavior, on the other hand, is an example of purely 
elementary collective behavior and lacks all organization (Lang and 
Lang, I96I1 493). Another important difference between social move­
ments and the associations is the high degree of spontaneity and
contagion associated with social movements.
When the unstructured aspects of social movements are
stressed, the tendency to view them on the same level of organization
as other forms of elementary collective behavior— the mass, the crowd,
and the public— must be avoided. The importance of these elementary
forms of collective behavior is the crucial part they play in the
emergence and early formation of social movements. The excitement,
unity, and energy of a crowd may provide the necessary situation and
conditions to ignite a movement. Also, the tactics and strategy of
a movement could stimulate the formation of crowds. The public*s
lack of resolving an issue may be the necessary ingredient to
sufficiently polarize an issue to cause one side to develop its
issues into objectives of a movement.
Social movements are in pursuit of an objective that has a
significant impact on the social order. A sizeable portion of the
society is involved in the movement. The pursuit of an objective
that affects and shapes the social order is a demand for change.
According to Marcel Chaput, a devout separatist and author of the
book, Pourauoi Je Suis Separatist, the French-Canadians have been
"battling for crumbs” for the past two hundred years. They are no
longer satisfied with bilingual and bicultural tokenism from Ottawa.
The French-Canadian separatist is in pursuit of an independent
"state of Quebec.”
The Langs (I96I1 490) define a social movement as
••elarge-scale, wide spread, and continuing, elementary 
collective action in pursuit of an objective that affects 
and shapes the social order in some fundamental aspect.
5Elementary collective action, as used by the Langs, emphasizes 
the unstructured and spontaneously generated forms of collective 
action. Elementary collective action differs from conventional 
behavior in that it is primarily based on spontaneity and contagion 
rather than on traditional forms of behavior. Collective action is 
unstructured in the sense that it is a departure from institutionalized 
forms of behavior. Yet, in some respects, it is organized to the 
degree that it refers to a collectivity in pursuit of a socially 
shared objective.
Finally, before discussing the essence of collective
behavior, two important features of the Langs' concept dealing with
collective behavior and social movements in general need mentioning.
Social movements involve people who are active and not passive
responders to trends or tendencies of the social system.
•••the substance of collective dynamics and mass behavior 
consists of those patterns of social action that are spon­
taneous and unstructured and therefore not reducible to a 
social structure. These collective patterns, since they 
emerge out of a more elementary kind of social interaction, 
cannot be fully explained on the basis of status and roles 
participants occupy within a given social setting (Lang and 
Lang, 1961* IX-12).
The other point that needs re-emphasizing is that behavior which
brings about social movements is collective and spontaneous and
focused on bringing about changes in the social order.
Collective Processes
Social movements do not just happen. They emerge out of 
social unrest. Social unrest is best explained by the processes 
of collective behavior. The ultimate purpose of the study of
collective behavior is to discern some of the ways social .movements 
and social institutions become organized and come into existence*
The Langs (196I1 2^^ -44) identify five basic processes, "collective 
processes," by which behavior is collectively transformed*
a. "Collective definition is the process by which cognitive 
assessments are brought in line with one another so that some common 
and plausible assessment emerges*" When individuals encounter new 
situations and events not covered by traditional norms, a definition 
of the situation is arrived at and followed by a collective response# 
The least structured way of arriving at some common definition is 
by rumor. Rumor leads to collective action when conventional 
behavior does not accomplish goals* Rumor serves two functions in 
the collective definition process* (l) it attempts to rationalize 
or make sense out of the situation? (2) it disrupts the traditional 
definition* Within a social movement, collective definitions may 
emerge as changing perspectives that serve to refocus the direction 
and objectives of the movement#
b# "Demoralization is when one's routine expectations and 
one's trust in official sources of information have been partially 
undermined# All kinds of breakdowns in norms are viewed as indica­
tive of demoralization, since norms and. standards of behavior no 
longer serve as points of orientation." Panic represents the behavior 
typical of this situation#
c* Collective defense# "During periods of stress, further­
more, anxieties are aroused. When these find a common focus and are 
acted out in behavior that does not threaten the unity of the group,
7one can speak of a process of collective defense*” The "crowd" 
offers a refuge for those overcome with stress and anxiety* Also, 
on a larger level, a mass movement can arise out of an alienated 
mass and is essentially a matter of collective defense against 
demoralization (lang and Lang, 19&Li 3^3)*
d* "Mass conversion- is the unexpected change of fundamental 
values under group influence.”
e* “Crystallization designates the process by which aliena­
tion from the social order finds expression in an elementary form of 
organization*” If, for the purpose of illustrating, the direction of 
"disorganization” is down and "organization" is up, then, within the 
collective processes, crystallization would be the first indication 
of an upward motion— and probably the first indication of a movement* 
Social movements emerge out of social unrest when discontent, hope, 
and goals crystallize into a collective response to a promise to 
cure social ills.
The collective processes do not propose a "stage model" of 
collective behavior; the sequence of these processes is situation
f
dependent. In addition to explaining the emergence of social move­
ments, these processes explain why people join and leave on-going 
movements* They help to explain the influence of such phenomena as 
communications, fashions, and public opinion on a mass society*
Social Unrest
Restlessness
The condition within the social order necessary for the
emergence of elementary collective behavior occurs when the balance 
between disruptive and re-integrative tendencies is especially pre­
carious (Lang and Lang* I96I1 ^2-^3)• This condition exists within 
the social order when there is no prescribed behavior within the 
inventory of traditional behavior patterns to deal with new situations. 
An encounter with a new situation requires an assessment to be made 
based on past experiences, current perceptions, and on some notion 
or idea of how the new situation is visualized to conclude.
Encounters with new situations and the conditions that foster 
new situations create a general restlessness (it's circular, conditions 
create situations and new situations reinforce the conditions). Rest­
lessness is expressed in the form of mass excitement (individual 
behavior), and manifests itself in anxiety, fear, and alienation. It 
is random, erratic, and in severe forms, it may be characteristic of 
neurotic behavior, and, as such, it has a tendency to alienate others 
rather than generate collective response to the stimulus causing the 
restlessness. In order for restlessness to develop into a higher form 
of behavior or become collective, it must become shared through a 
form of social interaction. According to Blumer (1972* 73)» "One may 
view social unrest as the socialization of restlessness."
Contagion
The Langs (196I1 209) use three concepts of contagion to 
explain the transformation of restlessness into social unrest.
These psychological concepts-^lmiiation, circular reaction, and 
suggestibility— are used to explain why individuals tend to act,
9
think, or feel as they observe others acting, thinking, or feeling*
Imitation takes into account an individual's perception 
of role models, learned behavior, and the meanings attached to a 
particular situation to explain why the individual copies a particular 
form of behavior.
Circular reaction refers to a type of "symbolic communication" 
wherein people respond to the meanings of vocal gestures, movements, 
or acts.
To the extent that A is aware what B's action means— that is, 
he can "read" B's intentions— A reacts to the significance 
that this action has both for B's future conduct and for his 
own in relation to B. But if B now takes into account the 
significance A will read into B's act, and if this signifi­
cance is the same for both, the meaning of the act is shared 
by both. By virtue of this, the act becomes a significant 
symbol, and from now on the behavior of both A and B is 
oriented to this shared meaning. (Lang and Lang I96I1 215)*
Herbert Blumer regards circular reaction as the most important
mechanism of elementary collective behavior.
...it gives rise to collective, or shared behavior, which is 
not based on the adherence to common understandings or rules.
It is for this reason that circular reaction is the natural 
mechanism of elementary collective behavior (Blumer, 19721 
71).
The concept of suggestibility places the leader in the active 
and dominant role. In this case the leader defines the situation 
for the participant. This is a one-way operation whereby the suscep­
tible participant responds to the suggestions of the leader.
These mechanisms of contagion supplement each other and are 
interrelated with the operation of the collective processes. Con­
tagion is the mechanism that makes spontaneous behavior collective 
behavior. The collective processes describe the ways in which
forms of social unrest express themselves.
10
Conditions of Social Unrest
All social unrest does not necessarily lead to large scale 
or visible collective responses; it may just dissipate without any 
consequences. However, social unrest is an incipient preparation 
for social movements. It plays two important functions in preparing 
society for changei
a. It disrupts any equilibrium or balance within the social 
structure by breaking down traditional behavior patterns through the 
modification of institutional patterns.
b. Social unrest prepares individuals and groups for 
changed definitions of the situation.
A movement arises when, .the general situation is favorable, 
and at the same time it gets its impetus from some specific person 
or event (Lang and Lang, I96I1 51?)• Social unrest is a favorable 
situation for the rise of a movement. The conditions of social 
unrest which favor social movements are many. Some of the more 
significant ones are introduced here.
Societies undergoing rapid social change and societies in a 
state of transition are always to some extent disorganized and thus, 
more susceptible to social movements than the stable societies. In 
a disorganized society traditions no longer serve as a dependable 
guide to behavior. In a disorganized society, Individuals tend to 
become alienated, frustrated, and confused. According to Hoffer 
(1951* 20) frustration and confusion, rather than poverty and misery,
IX
give rise to social movements.
Perceived relative deprivation is a concept which depicts
the frustrations people experience when they are not receiving the
things in life to which they feel they are justifiably entitled.
Gurr (19681 52) points out that
Relative deprivation is a state of mind that can be defined 
as a discrepancy between peopled (value) expectations about 
the goods and conditions of life to which they are justifiably 
entitled» on the one hand* and on the other their value 
capabilities - what they perceive to be their chances for 
getting and keeping those goods and conditions.
It is important to note that relative deprivation is primarily in
the eye of the beholder; if one does not perceive that he is relatively
deprived! even if in fact he is relatively deprived, he normally does
not represent a source of discontent.
Economic, political, and social injustices (real, or perceived) 
provide fertile grounds for social unrest. When any or all of these , 
conditions conflict with the "deprived*s” image of social justice, 
a condition emerges whereby discontent reinforces discontent. A 
strong current in the French-Canadian Separatist ideology is the 
tenet that Quebec is a conquered nation, and only by a free "state 
of Quebec” will the French-Canadians break the ties of English- 
Canadian colonialism. Economic statistics show that the French- 
Canadians earn less than do the English-Canadians, and that the French- 
Canadians are generally blocked out of executive positions in big 
business organizations. Although the French language is the official 
language of Quebec, knowledge of the English language is a necessity 
when dealing with government and business organizations. The French- 
Canadian* s self-image (as a conquered nation) is reinforced each
12
time he encounters a discriminatory situation. In turn, his percep­
tions of social justice and self-image make the situation or condition 
more real than what really exists•
Prerequisites
In addition to the fundamental prerequisite of a 'vulnerable 
population, with all the processes and mechanisms that operate to 
bring about social unrest, other variables need to be recognized to 
explain the emergence and consequences of social movements.
Organization and Strategy
The organization and strategy of a movement changes as the 
movement progresses through the various phases. In the earliest stage 
it comprises a core group crystallized out of elementary collective 
action. As the movement passes from phase to phase the organization 
and strategy will take on the characteristics of the leadership, 
ideology, and objectives (goals). The Langs (I96I1 531) list 
several structural problems that must be solved if the movement is to 
survive *
1. Regularizing the relations between leaders and followers.
2. Developing an appropriate type of leadership.
3* Determining the hierarchy of leaders and functionaries.
4. Organizing of a staff.
5. Co-ordinating the relations among various groups within 
the movement.
Leadership
Leadership Is a necessary prerequisite for a social movement. 
It acts as a catalyst in the crystallization of a movement. According
13
to Hoffer (1951* 10*0 leadership is an indispensable unifying agent 
in a movement; "without him (a leader) there will be no movement*M 
On the other hand, the leader is helpless until the conditions for a 
movement are right. "No matter how vital we think the role of 
leadership in the rise of a mass movement, there is no doubt that 
the leader cannot create the conditions which make the rise of a 
movement possible” (Hoffer, 1951* 103)*
Leaders play an important role as unifiers. They are agents 
of contagion during the milling stage, the incipient stage, of a 
movement. They serve as examples for the discontented to imitate. 
Because they are recognized as leaders, they are able to define 
situations, define social ills, and implant a spirit of hope -in the 
participants. A major task of leadership, regardless of the stage 
the movement is in, is to focus generalized social unrest toward the 
movement * s objectives•
Ideology
The ideology of a movement reflects the unique character of 
the movement.' Ideology justifies actions, reinforces beliefs, and 
perpetuates the cause. It provides guidance and direction for the 
leaders, followers, and participants. Ideology is conducive to the 
formation of collective definitions that support the movement and 
enhance unity within the movement.
Rallying Points
There are other factors in the category of social objects 
and unifying agents that determine the viability of a movement.
A movement does not have to emanate from a social object to be 
influenced by it. However, a movement needs something at which to 
"point its finger." A villain serves to move the collectivity into 
action, "Mass movements can rise and spread without a belief in a 
God but never without a belief in a devil" (Hoffer, 1951* 86). On 
the other hand, a social object may be a source of inspiration (in 
the form of an idol rather than through the organizational structure 
leadership). De Gaulle served the French-Canadians in this capacity 
External events that serve as rallying points for the movement are 
unifying agents. The idea that the French-Canadians are victims of 
colonalism was drawn from the African independence movements.
CHAPTER II
• SOCIAL AND HISTORIC BASES OF FRENCH-CANADIAN 
NATIONALISM AND SEPARATISM
Introduction
To understand French-Canadian separatism in the light of 
French-Canadian nationalism and Canada in general, the social history 
of French-Canada must be examined in more detail# The purpose of 
this chapter is not to recount a history but to highlight the signi­
ficant social conditions and historic events in French-Canadian 
history which fostered and perpetuated the nationalism and social, 
unrest that eventually gave rise to the French-Canadian separatism 
movement#
French-Canadian nationalism was bom when the British first 
attempted to assimilate the French into the Anglo-Saxon culture.
This national.ism became stronger through the influence of the Roman 
Catholic Church. The interrelationship of the Church and the educa­
tional system strengthened nationalism# but failed to prepare French- 
Canada (Quebec) for the consequences and forces of industrialization 
and urbanization. For the most part, French-Canadian separatism 
remained submerged in the nationalist movement until the early 1960's# 
Separatism emerged only on a few occasions prior to post World War II.
15
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Nationalism and separatism are not synonymous. French- 
Canadian nationalism, as a social movement, has general and non­
specific goals and objectives. Its primary objective is to maintain 
the French way of life. The French-Canadian nationalists use the 
term, "la survi vance" (ethnic survival) to express their feelings of 
nationalism. The French-Canadian separatist movement has the same 
general objective, but more specifically, its goal is to be able to 
maintain the French way of life by controlling all French-Canadian 
social institutions (especially the economic institution over which 
the French-Canadians have the least control). According to the 
separatists, this can be accomplished only when Quebec obtains 
complete sovereignty. Thus, the French-Canadian separatists use 
the term, "l'epanouissement" (emancipation), to express the nature 
of their goal.
The British Conquest
The British defeated the French on the Plains of Abraham
(near Quebec City) an September 13* 1759* Four years later France
; ■
ceded New France (what now is Canada) to Britain. This event had 
psychological significance as well as social and historic implications 
for the future relations of French and English—  Canadians • The 
separatists would have it that the separatist movement was born the 
day after the British defeated the French (Corbett, 196?* 27)•
They draw on this evenf to support their self-definition as a con­
quered nation. The popular phrase "Je me souviens" is used by the 
French-Canadians to remind them of the days of New France, and to
17
serve as a constant reminder that the French-Canadians are a conquered 
people (Wade, 1955* **?)• French-Canadian historians, especially 
those with strong separatist feelings, take great care to emphasize 
in their history their minority status under British rule* Abbe 
Lionel Grouix, a French-Ganadian historian, and a source of nation­
alist ideology after the turn of the century, made famous the phrase 
"Notre maitre, le passe" ("Our master, the past") and established it 
as a principle for action in the present (Wade, 1955* l)*
Following the British conquest, there was an unsuccessful 
attempt by the British to assimilate and "protestantize" the French 
(Clark, 1965* 16). Most of the French administrators and officials 
had returned to France when New France became a British colony. 
According to Clark (1965* 1?) the remaining French population con­
sisted of peasants, small merchants, some seigneurs, and a total of 
one hundred and sixty-four parish priests and monks. Thus without 
its political leadership, and all ties with France broken, the French- 
Canadian population stood alone to defend its way of life against 
assimilation by the dominant Anglo-Saxon culture. An important conse­
quence of this situation was the emergence of the Roman Catholic 
Church as the defender of the. French-Canadian *s right to maintain his 
identity with French culture, to speak the French language, to practice 
the Roman Catholic religion, and to keep his own customs and privileges. 
The early British governors of the French colony were very lenient 
toward the French and won the support of the Church (Armstrong, 19^7*
)^. The promise not to protestantize the French was made official by 
the Quebec Act of 177^* This act gave the French-Canadians free
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exercise of religion and retention of French law. This act also 
served to reinforce the Church's support for the British government 
and prevented the French-Canadians from joining the American Colonies 
in the revolution against England (Armstrong, 1937* 5-6) •
The Church and the Educational System
The Catholic Church played a significant role in the evolution 
of the French-Canadian society. The parish, a territorial unit of 
the Catholic Church, replaced the seigniorial estates in rural French 
Canada and became the significant unit of social organization 
(Falardeau, 19**9*. 528-529.) • "The spiritual leader of the community, 
the cure, took over many responsibilities of municipal leadership and 
became the secular as well as the religious leader of the local group 
committed to his care" (Falerdeau, 19^9)* The urban parish does not 
exercise this degree of control over the lives and activities of its 
members. However, the urban parishes provide a means of controlling 
and directing discontent and frustrations within the Church organiza­
tion through various movements and professional associations called 
"Catholic action" movements (Falardeau, 19^9* 353~36?)• The Church 
maintained its influence over the French-Canadian population and 
supported the Canadian government until the. late 1950*s'.and early 
1960's when its control was weakened by urbanization and internal 
conflict within the Church, especially between the older and younger 
clergy (Wade, 19681 1107-1109).
The influence of the Church was prevalent in the educational 
system in French-Canada. According to Armstrong (193?) * the Quebec
educational system was supervised and staffed by members of the 
clergy. The "Catholic committee" selected teachers and approved the 
curriculum for most of the schools in Quebec* This gave education 
a strong religious flavor* "its object has been to form good men 
who shall also be good Catholics," (Armstrong, 1937* ^0)# Hughes 
(19^3* 106-3JA) points out in his study of a French-Canadian community 
that the emphasis on training in the classics and professions (doctors, 
lawyers, dentists, etc.) in the French-Canadian schools left its 
graduates ill-prepared to assume a managerial role in commerce and 
industry when industrialization impacted on French-Canada during the 
early 19^0*s. Thus, ownership and management of French-Canadian 
industry became dominated by the English-Canadians and the United 
States investors. This situation presented a source of frustration 
for the French-Canadian aspiring for "materialistic success" (as 
opposed to the idealist nature of his education)• Initially, strong 
nationalist feelings (the French-Canadian*s value system) prevented 
the French-Canadian from questioning or accusing his social system 
for his inferior position. Subsequent definitions of this situation, 
the French-Canadian*s inferior status in the economic system, served 
to alienate the French-Canadian new middle class from traditional 
values and established the English-Canadian and United States business 
in Quebec as "villains" of the separatist movement.
The Economic Institution
The influence the Church had on other institutions during 
the period of the British conquest was a function of the Church*s
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stability and the disorganization experienced by the other institutions 
during this period of rapid social change# The Roman Catholic Church 
had a "foothold" in Quebec at the time of the British conquest, and 
through its zeal to maintain Catholicism in Quebec its influence 
overflowed into the other institutions# The economic institution 
was no exception# There was never:one dominant economic system 
throughout the entire history of New France# The seigniorial system 
in New France was modelled after the land tenure system in France 
and was intended to be the foundation of the colony*s economic system# 
This system has been described as a failure and, at best, a limited 
success (Fregault, 195*0 • The Seigniorial system, as an economic 
base, could not withstand the competition from the lucrative fur 
trade business, and failed as a means of social integration when the 
Church assumed that function.
Before the British conquest the French-Canadians lacked a 
viable entrepreneurial class (Corbett, 1967* 15) • After the conquest, 
French industry suffered when the merchants who remained after the 
British conquest lost their trade connections with Paris and the rest
t
of Europe. This, coupled with the influx of British merchants to 
Canada with the invading British Army, gave the English-Canadians an 
overwhelming edge in the economic arena. Eventually, the fur trade 
business, the most lucrative commercial enterprise in Canada at the 
time, was taken over from the French by the British. According to 
Corbett (1967* 16) within a few years after the conquest the English- 
Canadians dominated industry in Canada and the French-Canadians 
became farmers.
21
Early Expressions of Separatism
The French-Canadian social system that evolved from the 
changes associated with the British conquest prepared the French-* 
Canadian to define situations in terms of their threat to his culture. 
The English-Canadian and British were natural targets when the French- 
Canadian became faced with these situations.
The first indication of French-Canadian separatism was the 
Riel Rebellion. Riel, a French-Canadian half-breed, led the Metis 
Indians in a protest movement against Canadian domination and 
annexation of the new territories. The French-Canadians regarded 
Riel as a patriot who sought to protect the rights of a French 
Catholic population and who was now being punished by the English- 
Canadians because of his religion and ethnic heritage. Riel was 
sentenced to hang by an English-Canadian judge in 1885. His execution, 
more than any other event, proved to the French-Canadians that Canada*s 
responsibility was to the English Majority first (Corbett, 1967* 28).
The first significant separatist activity, the World War I
conscription crisis, was inspired by the bilingual school issue in
\
Ontario, a totally unrelated issue. The school question centered 
around an Ontario Department of Education regulation which limited 
the use of French as the language of instruction in French-English 
schools (Armstrong, 1937* 90-99) • The French-Canadians in Ontario 
and in Quebec (the self-appointed protector of all French-Canadians 
in Canada) defined this action on the part of the English-Canadians 
as a threat to the separate school system. Prior to the school
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controversy, French-Canadians were supporting the war in Europe 
with volunteers for the armed forces (Armstrong, 1937* 89) • To 
the French-Canadian nationalist "les anglais'1 were depriving the 
French-Canadians in Ontario of a "French” education* The nationalist 
could not reconcile this condition with fighting an "anglais" wax 
in Europe* They became more concerned with a more important cause 
at home, one that had to do with defending their culture rather 
than defending foreign soil. As a result the French-Canadians, not 
only in Quebec but in the western provinces as well, collectively 
opposed conscription and the wax (Armstrong, 1937* 95)•
Henri Bourassa, the owner of the newspaper "Le Devoir" 
spread nationalist and anti-conscription sentiments throughout the 
French population (Wade, 1955* 75^*7^). Lionel Groulx initiated the 
first teachings of French-Canadian history at the University of 
Montreal in 1915 (Wade, 1955* 755)• His nationalist and separatist 
interpretations of Canadian history stressed the differences and 
antagonisms between the French-Canadians and the English-Canadians, 
and were well received by the French-Canadian youth.
French-Canadian nationalist sentiment reached its peak during 
June-August 1917» when violence and rioting became widespread. Crowds 
would march through the streets of Montreal shouting anti-conscription 
and separatist slogans, "A bas Borden" ("Down with Borden," the Prime 
Minister) and "vive la revolution." A riot broke out in Quebec City 
as the result of a public speech made by a politician to the effect 
that, "If conscription law is enforced, Canadians have only one 
choice— to die in Europe or to die in Canada. As fax’ as I am
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concerned, if my body is to fall in any land, I want it to be on 
Canadian soil” (Wade, 1955* ?**?)•
The events and the school issue building up to the conscrip­
tion crisis, as defined by the French-Canadian nationalists, proved 
that French-Canadians and their interests were secondary to the 
English-Canadians. If their interests were to be protected, the 
French-Canadian would have to take an active lead. The World War I 
conscription crisis was an important factor that contributed to the 
later (i960*s) and dynamic emergence of the separatist movement*
1. The French and English-Canadians became divided on key 
issues which remain unresolved.
2. Nationalist and separatist ideology emerged as a 
deliberate program for action.
3* A precedent for active protest and violence was set 
which made the French-Canadian response to World War II conscription 
a foregone conclusion.
4. The conscription crisis demonstrated that the French- 
Canadians could unite for a common cause.1
When World War II and another bout with conscription came 
upon Quebec, the French-Canadians had the benefit of Abbe Groulx's 
nationalist ideology. Canada had just experienced a great economic 
depression. The French-Canadians were beginning to realize their 
inferior position in Quebec industry and, therefore, were little 
concerned with the problems in Europe and especially another war 
(Wade, 1968* 916). French-Canadian nationalism was kept in check 
by traditionalist opponents and by the lack of complete endorsement
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by the Quebec Roman Catholic clergy. The Prime Minister of Quebec, 
Maurice Duplessis, preached a demagogic nationalism but always 
deferred to the United States and English-Canadian investors who 
controlled Quebec*s industry (Wade, 1968* 1107“1108). Another counter 
to the growth of nationalism and the emergence of separatism is that 
Duplessis never challenged the Church's complete control of education 
and massive influence on the French-Canadian's life in general.
The conscription issue during the Second World War was not 
as violent as the crisis experienced during World War I. However, 
there were minor outbursts against conscription (Wade, 19681 1070-1072). 
In 1939 the Canadian Prime Minister stated, "So long as this govern­
ment may be in power, no such measure (conscription) will be enacted.”
In April 1942 a plebiscite was held in which the electorate was asked 
to release the administration from its past commitments. For the
■ X
whole country the plebiscite showed 64 per cent of the votes in favor 
of releasing the government of its previous commitment. The Quebec
vote was an overwhelming 80 per cent "No” vote. The French-Canadians
\
felt the government had no right to renege on its promise (Wade,
1968* 916-990). Once more the French-Canadians found themselves in 
opposition to the rest of Canada.
An outgrowth and reaction to the World War II conscription 
issue was the formation of the "Bloc Populaire," a movement of 
nationalist youth which was organized in 1942 and a forerunner of 
the i960 separatist movement (Wade, 1968* 1001).
This then, was the status of French-Canada as it found 
itself caught up in a period of rapid transition and had to dead with
the following*
1# A merging of urbanization and industrialization*
2. The role of the Church as the sanctioning institution 
of social values*
3* The traditional national goal, "survivance."
CHAPTER III
SEPARATISM AND THE FRENCH-CANADIAN t 
PARTICIPATION AND THE PARTICIPANTS
French-Canadian separatism emeiged as a visible expression
of discontent during a period of rapid social change occurring in
the immediate post-World War II period of Quebec* This period#
identified byvmany as the "Quiet Revolution#" marked the beginning of
the current separatist movement. For the most part# the conditions
and changes taking place in Quebec were not contrived by the French-
Canadian nationalists, and happened independently of nationalism or
the separatist movement* According to the Langs (1961i 50?)*
The social movement# while itself a collective enterprise to 
effect changes in the social order# is also a response to 
changes in social conditions that have occurred independently 
of its efforts* Social movements# therefore, are more likely 
to arise in a society undergoing rapid social change than in 
a stable one*
!
This is precisely the case of the French-Canadian nationalist 
movement and the emergence of the separatist movement* French- 
Canadian nationalism did not bring about urbanization and industriali­
zation i if anything traditional nationalism was against or neutral to 
urbanization* This was especially true of the Church which stood to 
lose to urbanization its control over the rural population and its 
influence and status of preserving the French culture* Industrializa­
tion and urbanization created the conditions which forced French
26
Canadians to redefine their position in Quebec in relation to that 
of the English Canadian* The complete and sudden change in Quebec's 
political leadership was independent of any nationalist undertakings# 
but It was a significant factor in mobilizing the French-Canadians 
for a separate Quebec. These conditions and their ramifications 
Ignited the separatist desire which was fed and inspired by key 
events and the Identification with social objects at critical times 
to keep the movement alive*
Changing Conditions and Perspectives
Urbanization
The many social changes that have occurred in Quebec (French- 
Canada) are related to urbanization. Urbanization accentuated and 
caused severe problems of economic inequality expressed in severe 
social class differences. Another significant consequence of 
urbanization was the disintegration of traditional social institu­
tions, specifically church# family and education.
The French-Canadian, for the most part, was an unskilled 
worker in French-Canadian industry* the managers, and owners came 
from the English-Canadians and Americans. The French-Canadlan's 
relegation to unskilled work was a function of his education and the 
teachings of the Quebec Roman Catholic Church. Everett Hughes 
(1963* 55). in his study of the impact of industry on a French- 
Canadian town, found that the managerial staff of a particular textile 
mill was exclusively English-Canadian and only twenty-five out of 
eighty-two foremen were French-Canadians. (See Table I).
EM
PL
OY
EE
S 
CF 
MI
LL
 
A 
IN 
CA
NT
ON
VI
LL
E 
BY 
NA
TI
ON
AL
IT
Y 
BA
NK
, 
AN
D 
DE
PA
RT
ME
NT
, 
19
37
28
$o
EH
U«
3o
EH
Sz;
oS
o
o
co
<r\
vO
CM
Ri
O-
cn
CM
ON
00c~\
oo
oo
o o o
• • •
O O' oo o o
O  ^  N  ON H
• • • • •
O  CO Qv Ov
rN co vr\ vo
vtn CO
rj
CM r-fcn
CM
nfc 
- w 
p  
d o>
np
oe-«
ON
vO On iH O  O  
ON vO iH ^  C^
CM Q\ CM 00
CM CO rH VO ON
MD rH CM
CM
O- vO On O 
CM
CN- OO CMVO O  VO ON <T\
m .
<L>d
P • O
d N O© nj P X t
6 hi © d
9> © COh •>
o © t©
>> o
5
© <H u
> •k «H ©
o O ©
■8
u
© d 5
d d •H t©
. © p n) d
& eA) o 3S w,
* s rHP o rH • •
CO < rH CM
• • • •
M M M
M W
M
o  o  
• - •
o o o o
rH rH
00 ON
CO
8 5
0^
ON
CM rH
00 vOr—i
o
rH O
CM
VO CM 
CM 00 
rH 00
oo r\
CM CM
Pi rO
'O M
S O) (0
&
© rO*H <H ©
O O JC 
P
©
© ©
*8
W) d *H
n} P  P
a
*H
S S '
©
©  -C © h o ©  
© d *h
fi'8 8
3•H Tj
O ©
(x, t© © © P
rd w
© Pi
fc- ©
rH
© Pi rf «H
on rv o 
-=}• rH W
Th
is
 
ta
bl
e 
is 
ta
ke
n 
fr
om
 
Hu
gh
es
 
(1
96
3«
 
55
)
29
For the French-Ganadian to aspire to greater levels in the 
industrial hierarchy would require him to give up too much of his 
French culture. A traditional French-Canadian education did not 
provide the type of training to support the technical skills required 
in industry. S. D. Clark (1971* 83)# in his study of French-Canadian 
industrial communities, identified, in addition to a lack of technical 
skills, the French-Canadian's commitment to his ethnic origin and 
rel igion as key factors that tied the French-Canadian to his community 
and consequently to the unskilled jobs. The French-Canadian's con­
cern over his language, religion, and way of life in general takes 
precedence over advancement. The French Canadian's attempt to maintain 
his cultural heritage is evidenced in Hughes' (19^3* 180) description of 
how the French-Canadian industrial workers created a self-imposed hard­
ship by building "Shanties" outside of town in an effort to maintain 
the rural spirit and existence under town, wage-working conditions.
These settlements, in many cases, constituted slum-like conditions 
without the conveniences and services of town life.
Once committed to urbanization, family traditions began to 
break down. The family tradition of passing the family property on 
to the oldest son became obsolete (Hughes, 19^3* 18^). The passing 
of this tradition served to weaken the family's control over the 
individual and the Church's influence over the individual and the 
family.
The United States met industrialization with technical 
education and organizations, in the form of trade unions, to cope 
with the problems of an industrial civilization (Hughes, 19^3* 211).
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Unless mechanisms exist for the adaption and incorporation 
into the social order of the demands of dissatisfied groups, 
these segments of the population, finding their aspirations 
unrecognized, will provide a fertile field for the growth 
of sectarian associations (Lang and Lang I96I1 507)*
The French-Canadians did not have the mechanisms for meeting the
frustrations and anxieties associated with industrialization and
urbanization* The organization closest to a trade union were the
"Catholic Action" groups sponsored by the Church* However, the Church
hierarchy was in collusion with the political machine of Duplessis
to further the nationalist cause of "survivance." As such, the
Church and government supported industry by providing a trouble-free
labor force*
The subordinate position of the French-Canadian worker in 
the urban community, the fact that the superior and controlling 
positions in industry were occupied by English-Canadians and Americans, 
and the slum-like living conditions of the industrial workers provided 
the conditions fostering misery and destitute characteristic of a 
proletariat social movement* However, a movement of this type failed
to materialize from the French-Canadian working class* This lends
? • .
credence to Eric Hoffer's (1951* 20) postulate that "frustration and 
confusion, rather than poverty and misery, give rise to social move­
ments*" Obviously, there were expressions of social, unrest and dis­
content against the industrial hierarchy during the 19^0 *s and 1950’s 
but not to the extent that they became an organized (workers or 
nationalist) movement against "foreign" control of French-Canadian 
industry* What did emerge, however, during the mid and late fifties 
was the "new middle class" (Ossenberg, 1971* 103-123)» the vanguard
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of the separatist movement.
Political Conditions and Changes
The new middle class is another consequence of urbanization. 
The mass exodus from country to city in response to Industrialization 
naturally required additional staffing of urban institutions. Guindon 
(196*4-1 150-162) calls this the bureaucratic revolution. The new 
middle class was the recipient of the Union Rationale's (the encumbent 
political party) corruption and oppression. Thus the Union Nationale 
and its leader, Duplessis, became the source of frustration for the 
new middle class.
Between 19^ and 1959t Quebec Premier Maurice Duplessis ruled 
the province with an iron hand; his major allies were the Roman 
Catholic Church and industry. Duplessis* regime was marked by con­
servatism, Quebec nationalism (not separatism), authoritarianism, 
corruption, and the ruthless repression of reform (Clark, 1965* 21-23)* 
Under Duplessis, as political scientist Rolf Spencer observed,
French-Canadians - always seeing themselves in the role of 
the defeated minority - developed a religious and educational 
introversion, a tight, inward-looking, backward order which 
emphasized family, land, church, and traditions (196*4-1 283-286).
Hubert Guindon (196*4-* 152-15*4-) made the following comments concerning
the new middle class and Duplessis,
...the economic and status interests of this new middle class 
were not being met. Salaries could not be increased. Why?
Because of Duplessis. Staff could not be hired. Why?
Because of Duplessis.
Duplessis became a symbol of oppression, of reactionary government. 
The growth of semi-public bureaucratic institutions required 
greatly increased and predictable amounts of money from the 
provincial treasury. Because he refused to meet these class
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demands, Duplessis was emotionally and unanimously resented by
the new middle class. Where Duplessis failed, Sauve succeeded.
Guindon notes that Duplessis based his political machine on the rural 
and lower-urban social strata* After his death these classes felt 
unrepresented, uncared for, with no significant voice in the political 
arena* The Liberal party which replaced the Union Rationale, and its 
leader Lesage were unable to gain the support of the lower social 
strata. On the other hand, it was the new middle class who elected 
the Liberal party and Lesage to office. Interviews with members of 
both the new middle class and the lower urban strata confirm Guindon*s 
comments concerning the French-Canadian*s image of Duplessis (Notes, * 
1972).
The new middle class consisted of the educated, professional 
and semi-professional, salaried, white-collar workers. Their source of 
frustrations under the Duplessis regime was basically a lack of recog­
nition of job importance by the government. As such, Duplessis was 
the scapegoat and the oppressor. After his death most of the demands 
made by the new middle class for economic and status recognition were 
met by the government. Even with the government's accommodation, the 
status of the French-Canadian middle class did not match that of the 
English-Canadian civil servant or the Ehglish-Canadian in private 
industry. The new middle class became acutely aware of its relatively 
deprived status and set out to do something about it— independence 
for French-Canada "etat de Quebec.” The English Canadians and foreign 
Investors and managers of French-Canadian industries replaced 
Duplessis as the scapegoat.
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Relative Deprivation
At the beginning of the decade of the I960*s over five 
million of Canada’s eighteen million people lived in the province of 
Quebec* Approximately four million Quebeckers* (98 percent of the 
province’s population) mother tongue was French; 62 percent of this 
group spoke only French (Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Bi- 
culturalism, 196?t Book Ii 15“39)• Lieberson's research reveals 
that in 1961 monolingual English-Canadians income was $5124 compared 
to $4385 for the bilingual French-Canadian (l970i 171)* (Additional 
data concerning the effect of education, occupations, and ethnic 
origin are found in Tables II and IH)* Seventy-seven percent of the 
jobs in Quebec paying $15,000 a year or higher were held by English- 
Canadians » who comprised only 30 percent of the total work force, 
and the average income of an English-Canadian was 40 percent higher 
than the provincial average (Newsweek* 19701 43) • The unemployment 
rate in Quebec traditionally was higher than elsewhere in Canada*
In one typical year during this period, French-Canadians, who made 
up approximately 25 percent of Canada’s work force, accounted for 
41 percent of the nation's unemployed* Nationwide, unemployment 
ran at about 7 percent? in Quebec, it stood at 10 percent (Business 
Week, 19701 36).
The French-Canadians faced a tremendous disadvantage in 
industry? the English “Canadians and the Americans controlled Quebec’s 
economy (Lieberson, 1970* 83-85)* Few French-Canadians occupied 
positions of importance in large corporations, the federal civil 
service, or the armed forces. For example, only about 11 percent of
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the senior positions in the federal civil service were held by 
French-Canadians j in one typical year, of 11?5 high-ranking federal 
civil servants, only 135 were French-Canadians (Caloren, 19671 915), 
Another survey revealed that of I63 civil servants receiving salaries 
of $14,000 a year or more, only 6 were French-Canadians (Clark,
19651 146).
The French-Canadians in the early I960*s were relatively 
deprived and more importantly their daily activities made them aware 
that their position was subordinate to the English-Canadian#
Susceptibility of the French-Canadian
Collective Processes
The French-Canadian situation at the beginning of the i9601 s 
illustrates the operation of the Langs* (1961) "collective processes" 
discussed, in Chapter I. In applying these processes to the Quebec 
situation it must be remembered that when dealing with a large scale 
operation, a collective response to a given situation may take a 
period of time to develop. Also, there is not a clear cut distinction 
when one process stops and another starts since the processes 
usually operate simultaneously and tend to work toward and reinforce 
the cyrstallizatlon process.
The Church, family, educational, and political institutions 
have traditionally been paramount in the life of the French-Canadian. 
They served to define their culture and their way of life against 
assimilation into the Anglo Saxon culture. These institutions 
provided the definitions for the French-Canadian in assessing events
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and situations. He depended on the symbols of these institutions* 
the cure* (church)» papa* (family)* and "le chef#" Duplessis, (government) 
to provide reconcilable solutions and answers to changing conditions 
and events*
Demoralization occurred when traditional values and norms 
failed to provide for Prench-Canada's economic interests in the 
face of urbanization. Not only did conventional values and norms fail 
to provide the definitions for coping with urbanization, but tradi­
tional values, especially preservation of the French language, sub­
ordinated the French-Ganadian to the English-Canadian in Quebec. The 
process of demoralization became evident when the lower classes• 
response to urbanization is compared to the response of the new 
middle class. The lower class responded by attempting to make urban 
life fit into the traditional way of life. The French industrial worker, 
in spite of urbanization, refused to break away completely from the 
rural spirit. The value system of the rural spirit provided the 
definitions of urbanization that the lower class worker could live 
with. The lower class supported Duplessis* form of nationalism, even 
though it was detrimental to his economic well being, because it wan 
defined as supporting the French-Ganadian way of life. Consequently, 
there was very little if any demoralization in the lower strata. On 
the other hand, the new middle class entered the I960*s with its 
traditional ties to Church and family strained. The middle class 
was educated in an urbanized environment and their occupations 
departed from the traditional French-Canadian professional occupations. 
Their work environment was a constant reminder of their subordinate
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position to their English-Canadian counterpart. The new middle 
class could not reconcile traditional nationalism, taught by the 
Church and supported by the Union Nationale, especially Duplessis, 
with its inferior economic status. If the Church and state are 
supposed to be the protector of French-Canadian culture and way of 
life, why have they allowed the Ehglish-Canadian and foreign in­
vestors to take over and control Quebec•s industries? Why do the 
French-Canadian schools produce an education that is useless in the 
business world?
The new middle class's confrontation with the frustrations 
of urbanization naturally required assessments to be made of the 
situation. The sequence of events comprising the new middle class's 
response to perceived deprivation— the rejection of Duplessis, then 
its spontaneous support of Sauve's form of Union Nationale, and then 
its complete shift of allegiance to Lesage and the Liberal party- 
demonstrates the process of mass conversion and the degree of shared 
perspectives in its attempt to cope with frustrations and anxieties. 
The middle class's basic definition of the situation remained con­
stant, the dynamic shifting was a function of collective defense.
The scapegoating of Duplessis and the English Canadians is. a form of 
collective defense. In both cases it served as a common rallying 
point for the French Canadians (middle class) to vent their frustra­
tions. The middle class entered the decade leading the French- 
Canadian separatist movement and left behind the traditions associated 
with "survivance" and replaced it with "epanouissement."
The process of crystallization received its impetus from
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key events and through identification with social objects# This 
allowed the specific issue of economic subordination to solidify 
into the more sweeping and radical objective of separatism#
Separatist ideology represented a resurgence of French 
culture— renewed identity with French-Canadian history, the French 
language, and culture— all the traditional values which had before 
failed to provide adequate definitions. However, they were now 
directed toward separatism# The emphasis on ethnic heritage served 
two major purposes# It encouraged shared perspectives to provide 
for collective definitions and responses. It provided the movement 
with an idol and a scapegoat#
An idol personifies some general achievementj each society 
creates its idols in Its own image (Lang and Lang 1961* 291-331) •
During the early 1960* s President de Gaulle of France had started 
his eviction of all NATO armed forces from France. This to the French- 
Canadians was an expression of French independence which coincided 
with separatist ideology concerning the colonial status of Quebec#
This and de Gaulle's visits to Quebec made him an obvious idol and
! ■ ' -
rallying point in crystallizing the separatist movement (Notes, 1972).
On de Gaulle's visit to Canada in 1967» hls second visit to Canada in
) ' '
the decade, he broke diplomatic protocol by spending four days with 
the Quebec Premier in Quebec before visiting the Canadian Prime 
Minister (New York Times# 1967* July 2*f and 25)* De Gaulle was given 
a hero's welcome in Quebec by the French-Canadian separatists# He 
was greeted by crowds who carried separatist banners, waved the 
French national colors, and shouted "Vive le Quebec libre"
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(’’Free Quebec”)• De Gaulle responded with an appropriate separatist 
slogan, ''Vive la Nouvelle France!" (Long live New France!) (New York 
Times, 19671 July 27)* Later, in 1967# de Gaulle called on Canada to 
give Quebec the status of a sovereign state# These events, in 
addition to their significance as social objects, gave the French- 
Canadian separatist movement international recognition. According 
to a public opinion poll, published by New York Times (1967» August 
24), 45 percent of the French-Canadians disapproved of de Gaulle's 
actions and 18 percent approved.
If de Gaulle and "French" were positive rallying points for 
separatism, then Queen Elizabeth's visit to Canada and the English 
Canadians posed a negative Social object— scapegoat. The Queen's 
visit served as an .opportunity for the Separatist to protest a 
perceived colonial symbol and express a general discontent for English 
Canadiansj sis a negative rallying point, it served the same purpose 
as the idol. As social objects, they both serve as rallying points 
for common sentiments.
The French-Canadian's self-image as a colonized minority
made the liberation movements in Africa and Asia another point of
reference for the separatist movement.
French-Canadians are thus now the senior national minority in the 
western world; perhaps, instead of being proud of that position, 
they are wounded to think that minorities - younger, poorer, 
less educated and cultivated than they - have achieved a 
national status which they, the French-Canadians, have never 
really sought in large number and with continued determination 
(Hughes, I963* xiv).
Pierre Bouzgault, a conservative separatist, stated Quebec's identity
with colonialism as, "There are similarities of mentality between
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French-Canada and the inhabitants of all colonial countries. The 
French-Canadian is not the destitute and exploited chattel of 
classical colonialism, but intellectually and psychologically he 
does share a common bond with him" (Quoted in Jones, 196?* 19)•
French-Canadian separatism emerged as a consequence of the 
incongruence between urbanization and the French-Canadian traditional 
value system. This condition was fed by collective definitions and 
responses to subsequent events and situations that culminated in 
crystallizing Separatism into a social movement.
CHAPTER IV
SEPARATIST ORGANIZATIONS
The efforts of Lesage and his Liberal party in the early 
I960 *s to propel the French-Canadians into the urbanized, commercial­
ized, and industrialized world did not come fast enough and in 
sufficient amount to curb rising separatist sentiments. Out of 
Lesage*s "Quiet Revolution" numerous organizations with separatist 
"ideals" appeared in the form of socialist-reform, nationalist, ad 
hoc, and hard core permanent organizations. Conflict Studies 
(l972t lists twenty-five organizations either associated with or
identified as separatist organizations. Some of the separatist 
organizations, like the Front de Liberation du Quebec and Railiement 
National, were well known and strong in participant-follower support. 
Others were no more than criminal gangs operating under the cover of 
the separatist emotions. In 1968 a political separatist party,
Parti Quebecois, emerged as the "official" voice of separatism for 
the French-Canadians.
In this chapter the Parti Quebecois and the Front de Liberation 
du Quebec (FLQ) will be examined in terms of their impact on the 
separatist movement. The events and circumstances that sent the FLQ 
on its 1970 reign of terror will be highlighted., The effectiveness 
of the FLQ's organizational structure will be compared with the 
criteria for internal structure of core groups set forth by Lang
kZ
and Lang (1961). An appraisal will be made of the consequences of 
the FLQ's strategy and tactics.
Parti Quebecois
The issues surrounding the emergence of the Parti Quebecois 
were similar in nature to those that involved the French and English- 
Canadians in the Manitoba and Ontario school issue at the turn of 
the century. The 1969 issue started when a bill was presented to the 
Canadian parliament to promote the use of the French language in 
Quebec. Because of the French-Canadian reaction to the bill, it was 
withdrawn, but reintroduced the following year and subsequently 
passed (Dion and Seve, 197*** 12&-144).* This action, as was the 
previous school controversy (school issue 1895**1900) * was interpreted 
by the French-Canadians, especially the separatists, as another case 
of the Canadian government putting English-Canadiah interests before 
the interests and rights of the French-Canadian citizens of Quebec 
(Dion and Seve, 197*0 • This event was the key to the emergence of 
the Parti Quebecois. Based on the separatist definition of the 
intent of the federal government concerning the education bill, the 
separatist organizations "Mouvement Souverainete-Association" and 
"Ralliement National" merged to form the Parti Quebecois. Later, 
October 1968, another separatist political party, "Rassemblement pour 
1 * Independence Nationale" (RIN) joined the Parti Quebecois.
The formation of a legally recognized political party which 
represents a social, movement for the secession of a territory (Quebec) 
and its people (French-Canadians) is an unusual aspect of social
■kk
movements. It appears that a drive for political recognition at
this stage came prematurely. If the formation of a legal, organization,
Parti Quebecois, were applied to Hopper's (1950* 270-279) frame of
reference for the study of revolutionary movements, it would fall
in the final stage, the "Institutional stage." This stage exists,
according to Hopper,
When the attitudes and values of the revolutionary leadership 
have thus become the legal and political foundation of social 
organization, a new society has been formed and the revolution 
has been consummated.
At this time, 1968, the separatist movement did not have clear, strong 
and definitive leadership. The revolutionary groups, the FLQ and 
the like, certainly were not blessed with dynamic and available 
leadership. The popular leadership of the FI^ during this time,
Pierre Vallieres and Charles Gagnon, were serving life sentences in 
the Montreal prison f or murder in connection with the bombing of 
the La Grenade Shoe Factory. Rene Levesque was a popular political 
figure before he organized the Parti Quebecois, but as a political 
leader he was untried. A "society" existed, but it had not settled 
on how independence would be accomplished.. Generally the revolu­
tionary groups advocated the overthrow of capitalism and imperialism 
and the decolonization of Quebec. The Parti Quebecois was organized 
to seek independence for Quebec through the electoral system.
Without identifying a specific stage of development, the 
Langs (1961* 505) refer to the merger of groups in general. "Any 
core group, If it is to be successful, must be able to link up with 
other groups pursuing similar objectives." This is what happened in
**5
the formation of Parti Quebecois, but the particular form it took 
is the unusual aspect of its emergence.
Had the Parti Quebecois been able to gain and maintain more 
control over the FLQ, the October 1970 crisis might never have 
occurred and subsequent provincial elections might have been more 
favorable to the Parti Quebecois•
The circumstances and events surrounding the provincial 
general election of April 1970 caused the unrest and discontent 
that was to a large extent responsible for the October 1970 crisis—  
the kidnappings of the British diplomat James Cross and the Liberal 
cabinet minister Pierre Laporte. In that election the Parti 
Quebecois should have constituted the official opposition since it 
received 23*7 percent of the popular vote, but it won only seven out 
of one hundred eight seats (Saywell, 1971* 5*27). The separatist 
reaction to the election results is a prime example of the operation 
of the Langs (1961) collective process, demoralization. The separatist, 
supporting the democratic way to independence lost faith and trust in 
the official system as a means to achieve their objective. They 
became demoralized. (Data are not available on the number of Parti 
Quebecois supporters who turned to revolutionary means as a result 
of the election and related events).
The basis for the separatist cry of injustice concerns the 
lack of assembly seats acquired compared to the percentage of the 
total vote for the Parti Quebecois. The Union Nationals party won 
seventeen assembly seats with 19.6 percent of the total vote* the 
Ralliement Crediste party won twelve assembly seats with 11.1 percent
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of the total vote; hut the Parti Quebecois won only seven assembly 
seats with 23.7 percent of the total vote (Saywell, 1971).
Political Party Seats
Percentage of 
Total Vote
Liberals 72 41.8
Parti Quebecois 7 23.7
Union Nationale 17 19.6
Ralliement Crediste 12 11.1
Others 0 4.5
This discrepancy between the percentage of total votes and 
the number of seats it actually won was accounted for by the electoral 
system, a uninominal single-ballot voting system, and a uniform dis­
tribution of the separatist vote across the province (Saywell, 1971). 
This explanation did not convince the Parti Quebecois militants, who 
had worked enthusiastically during the election campaign for the 
"democratic solution" to separatism, that the outcome was not the 
work of the English-Canadians (Saywell, 1971)* The "coupe de la 
brinks" was a scare tactic used by the English-Canadians to frighten 
potential Pnrti Quebicois supporters and to discredit the party and 
separatism. A pre-election poll showed the Parti Quebecois posed a 
threat to the Liberal party. The rumor was circulated that stocks, 
bonds, bills, securities, etc., should be removed from Quebec because 
in the event of a separatist victory the Parti Quebecois would 
nationalize all foreign capital. A few days before the election a
**7
convoy of armored Brinks trucks -publicly paraded through Montreal to
Ontario (Saywell, 1971)* The significance of this event is in the
definitions formed after the election when the separatists related
their defeat in the election to this and other English-Canadian
connected events. Saywell (1971) describes an incident which was
a forecast of trouble*
Commenting on the Brinks affair and the joyful reactions in 
Montreal's English dailies, Mr. Parizeau warned that "these 
people are just waving a red flag in front of a fuming 
bull...they are really asking for trouble." Not only were 
the internal tensions made more acute, but the election 
results led many to question the democratic or representative 
system. As Parizeau exclaimed* "God help us...You see it is 
not my defeat nor that of Rene Levesque that is important.. •
It's the defeat of our arguments in favor of the parliamentary 
system."
As a result of the April 1970 (described by Bernard Smith as "Le 
Coup d*Etat du Avril 29") the Parti Quebecois lost what little 
influence it had had over the FLQ and thus the FLQ was free to 
carry out its reign of terror during the fall of 1970. In their 
Manifesto, the FLQ cite their impatience and the "Liberal victory 
proves that that which is called democracy in Quebec is and always 
has been the * democracy' of the rich" (FLQ Manifesto printed in 
Le Devoir, 13 October 1970, quoted in Dion and Seve, 197*0 as the 
causes of their revolutionary (violence and terrorism) behavior.
Front de Liberation du Quebec
The Front for the Liberation of Quebec (FLQ) came into exist­
ence in late 1962, aftd its activities date from the beginning of 1963 
(Vallieres, 1971)* The FLQ's founder was Georges Schoeters, a
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Belgian, •who immigrated to Canada in 1951* A strong admirer of , 
Fidel Castro, Schoeters visited Cuba in 1959 and I960. He was soon 
drawn to the cause of French-Canadian separatism, and, believing 
that revolutions always bring solutions, he established the FLQ#
Organization
The FLQ was organized into independent 3 to 6 man cells 
loosely controlled by a central executive committee believed based 
in Montreal# At one time or another, there were bombing, financial 
(robbery), propaganda, intelligence, and possibly assassination 
cells; however, a financial cell, for example, was not prohibited 
from carrying out a bombing (Pickering, 1970)# For security pur­
poses, a cell leader often did not know his men*s true identities, 
and he rarely knew more than one member of another cell; no member­
ship cards were issued and no membership rosters were drawn up 
(MacDonald, 1972; 234-235)* In describing the FLQ as "loosely 
controlled," the emphasis is on the first word rather than the 
second# A Canadian Army report claims that a central executive 
committee issued coded messages in communiques sent to and broad­
cast by the commercial news media (Pickering, 1970)# For all intents 
and purposes, however, each cell was autonomous and called its own 
shots# Journalist Tom Buckley of The New York Times Magazine (1970; 
December 6) described the FLQ as "a grouping# • • so loose that it 
hardly deserve(d) the name of an organization."
An article by the US News and World Report (197Q* November 2) 
estimated the FLQ's strength at approximately 150 active members
supported by perhaps 2000 sympathizers. The majority were students, 
laborers, and "street people"; most were in their late teens or 
early twenties. There is some dispute over the social background of 
the FLQ*s members. Moss (1972* 115) states that "a significant pro­
portion of the young men who made their way into the ranks of the 
FLQ were from the slums and shanty-towns of Montreal." Whereas 
Clark (1965* 16-17) says that "almost all (of the FI£*s members) 
were from good, respectable families of at least middle-income level. 
According to interviews (Notes, 1972) most of the members were from 
middle class families; however, there were a few of the types 
mentioned by Moss.
Strategy and Tactics
The FLQ*s goal was an independent French-speaking Quebec, 
set up as a radical-socialist state; violence was to be the means to 
this end. In it's first communique, issued in early 1963$ the FLQ 
announced that its mission was "to completely destroy, by systematic 
sabotage, all.the symbols of colonial (primarily English-speaking) 
institutions" (Time. 1963* June 14).
The communique also stated that the FLQ "suicide commandos" 
would sabotage government buildings, English-language newspaper 
offices, barracks, and businesses that practiced "cultural discrimina 
tion" (Moss, 1972* 121). Terrorist activities included bombings, 
armed robberies, and arms thefts, hitting such targets as military 
recruiting offices, banks, armories, gun shops, a radio/television 
tower, a Royal Canadian Mounted Police building, an oil refinery, 
and numerous mailboxes (Pickering, 1971)* One FLQ financing cell
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carried out seven robberies in six months* netting $40,000 in cash 
and $45,000 worth of guns and radio equipment before police caught 
all six cell members (MacDonald, 1972: 234)# The FLQ concentrated 
its actions in Montreal, Quebec's largest city, with a population 
of well over 2,000,000.
Internal Problems of the FLQ.
In spite of limited "success” in some areas, the FLQ 
suffered from structural problems. If a movement is to survive, it 
must deal with and overcome structural problems (Lang and Lang, 1961i 
531-532)• A major structural problem identified by the Langs is 
"regularizing the relations between leaders and followers."
The FLQ apparently experienced a lack of disciplined and 
dedicated members. For example, the police were able to exploit 
FLQ defections and internal quarrels (Mallory, 1972: 210). Moreover, 
very few of those FLQ members who were captured and convicted 
returned to the movement after their release from prison (Conflict 
Studies,‘1972: 10). It is perhaps this fact which led Canadian 
university professor Denis Smith (1971: 70) to remark that the FLQ 
seemed "to lack any permanent core of leaders.” In addition, one 
source has noted that most of the money which was stolen was "spent 
on high-living," (Gonflict Studies, 1972: 10), again suggesting a 
lack of discipline and dedication. Another major structural problem 
identified by the Langs (1961) is "coordinating the relations among 
various groups within the movement."
The FLQ's cellular organization enhanced security but not
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coordination. For example, most police attempts to infiltrate the 
organization failed. (One reason for these failures was that a 
candidate for membership in a cell was required to participate in 
some crime as a sign of his good faith.) However, the FLQ was rarely 
able to mount a coordinated attack involving more than one cell. 
Moreover, the extreme secrecy existing within each cell and between 
cells severely limited the transmission of information in a timely 
manner. An organization whose cell members often do not know each 
other's true identities, whose cell leaders know at most only one 
member of another cell, and whose central leadership (according to 
the Canadian Army) depends upon the commercial news media to pass 
messages, is hardly conducive to the rapid passing of critical infor­
mation. For example, timely warnings of police actions, in progress 
or impending, evidently often failed to reach the FLQ members con­
cerned, since time and time again the police were able to round up 
entire cells (Pickering, 1971).
The October 1970 crisis is another example of an FLQ internal 
organization problem. On Monday morning, October 5» 1970, four 
members of an FLQ cell kidnapped British Trade Commissioner James 
R. Cross from his Montreal home.
Pierre Laporte was kidnapped on October 10 by another cell, 
the "Chenier” finance cell (named after a French-Canadian doctor 
killed in the 1837 anti-British uprising). This action is a good 
example of the FLQ's lack of coordination and control, and lack of 
discipline within the group. The members of the Chenier cell were 
driving near Dallas, Texas, when they learned over the radio of the
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Cross kidnapping. They felt that Cross was a poor choice of victim, 
so they returned to,Canada to plan the kidnapping of a more 
"appropriate" victim* There is no indication whatsoever that the 
Chenier cell received any instructions from a central executive 
committee or any other outside source to kidnap Laporte* Thus, 
the Chenier cell carried out a second FLQ kidnapping on its own 
because it disagreed with another FLQ cell's choice of victim (Pickering,
1971).
Popular Support
Shortly after the FLQ was formed Marcel Chaput, a leading 
separatist politician, publicly speculated that English-Canadian 
agents provocateurs had founded the FLQ in order to discredit the 
separatist movement (Moss, 1972* -116). In spite of the opposition of 
a number of separatist political leaders, however, the FLQ had, 
according to Newsweek magazine (1970, October 26), "won at least 
qualified sympathy from many ordinary French-Canadians" by the fall 
of 1970* It is certainly possible, perhaps even probable, that a 
number of French-Canadian separatists sympathized with the FLQ \s 
ends, but not its means* Furthermore, those who would never take 
part in or support violence themselves may nonetheless enjoy seeing 
institutions they regard as oppressive being successfully attacked*
In regard to the mobilization of support, the FLQ enjoyed 
its greatest successes in two areas* First, the FLQ managed to 
infiltrate several organizations, including the Company of Young 
Canadians (CYC), a federally sponsored organization* Police
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investigations later revealed that one FLQ member had become co- 
chairman of the CYC, and that other CYC (actually FLQ) members had 
managed to divert CYC funds, reproducing machines, and cars for 
FLQ purposes, including the distribution of FLQ newspapers (Conflict 
Studies, 1972). Weapons and subversive literature were also seized 
in the homes of CYC (FLQ) members (Pickering, 1971)* The FLQ also 
managed to infiltrate the Front d' Act ion Politique (FRAP), a group 
which.provided candidates in the 1970 Montreal civic elections; one FRAP 
candidate who ran for office was in fact a member of the FLQ (Conflict 
Studies, 1972). Other organizations which the FLQ managed to pene­
trate and to radicalize to one degree or another included the National 
Confederation of Trade Unions and various student associations.
The second area where the FLQ enjoyed some success was in 
organizing mass demonstrations. The FLQ was rarely able to generate 
a mass demonstration solely in support of itself; in Other words, 
the FLQ on its own— not hidden behind a front— was unable to get the 
people into the streets. However, the FLQ was able to incite and 
encourage, and at times organize and give some direction to, demonstra­
tions by such groups as dissatisfied students and striking workers 
and taxi-drivers. It was found., for example, that at least twenty 
CYC members (actually FLQ adherents) had led violent demonstrations 
at one time or another. t During 1969» 100 demonstrations were held in 
Montreal alone— many of them inspired by the FLQ (Pickering, 1971)*
Reaction
The FLQ had hoped that its kidnappings and acts of violence
would force the government into overreacting, into taking extreme 
measures that would alienate the French-Canadian populace and drive 
it into the active separatist camp* While the bombings, robberies, 
and kidnappings did generate publicity for the group, most likely 
enhanced the FLQ's morale, and perhaps pleased some separatist , 
sympathizers, the terrorist acts also frightened and angered many 
of Quebec's citizens, both French-Canadian and English-Canadian.,
For one thing, none of the bomb victims, including a 65~year-old 
night watchman and a 64-year-old secretary, could have been considered 
by any stretch of the imagination "an exploiter of the working 
masses”; moreover, some of the victims were French-Canadians 
(Newsweek. 1963)# May 61 58)* In fact, the FLQ's chief bomb maker 
quit in 1966 because he "became disillusioned at the slaughter of 
innocent victims;" this was a major reason that 1967 was singularly 
free of violence (Riseborough, 1975* 17-25)* During the period 
1963-1970, however, the FLQ conducted more than 200 bombings in 
Quebec alone; overall, the terrorists averaged one bomb planted 
every ten days in the seven years they were active (Conflict Studies,
1972).
The addition of kidnapping to the FLQ*s reign of terror 
certainly did not increase the Quebec populace's feeling of safety.
The FLQ had hoped to get the people into the streets; instead, it 
scared many Quebeckers off the streets. One Quebec French-Canadian 
remarked, "The FLQ makes me afraid to walk the streets of my own city. 
That is the meaning of terrorism." (MacDonald, 1972* 224). During 
the crisis period, Montreal theaters and restaurants had very few
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customers, a result hardly conducive to generating support for the 
FLQ from those French-Canadians who depended upon these businesses 
for their livelihoods (Buckley, 1970i 150). A number of French- 
Canadians actually felt relieved when federal troops arrived to 
assist the police and the War Measures Act was placed in effect. As 
Buckley (1970; 15°) remarked, "unmistakably • • . the Quebec public 
feared the bombing and kidnapping of the front (the FLQ) more than 
it did the possibility of abuse of police power."
CHAPTER V
AN ASSESSMENT OF THE SEPARATIST MOVEMENT
The Emergence of the Movement
According to the Langs* (1961) definition of social movements, 
French-Canadian separatism meets the criteria for a social movement. 
Separatism is widespread and large-scale, it concerns the province 
of Quebec which includes approximately six million people. It 
involves continuing collective action in pursuit of a specific 
objective that shapes the social order. Separatist goals seek 
independence for Quebec that would give it nationhood status, complete 
sovereignty.
Conditions and Social Change
The separatist movement emerged out of social conditions that 
were created and exposed by social change. Social conditions do not 
cause social movements. They provide the social backdrop for unrest 
and give the movement its unique character and flavor. ^The French- 
Canadian culture and social structure provide conditions for the 
separatist movement. Quebec's school system was dominated by the 
Roman Catholic Church that emphasized an education in the classics 
and professions. Ibis type of training provided the French-Canadian 
with a respectable education and served to perpetuate French-Canadian 
culture. However, the French-Canadian traditional education failed
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to prepare the French-Canadian to compete with his English-Canadian 
counterpart in Quebec's economic system. The traditional education 
was not seriously questioned until French-Canada began to feel the 
impact of industrialization and realized the inferior position of 
the French-Canadian in Quebec's economic system^/ The French- 
Canadian society, led by the Church, was primarily concerned with 
preserving its way of life as indicated by the popular nationalist 
phrase, "Notre maitre, le passe" ("Our master, the past"). The 
French-Canadian nationalist goal is ethnic survival. As long as the 
French-Canadian social institutions were protected from assimilation 
by a dominant Anglo-Saxon culture, their nationalist aspirations were
being fulfilled.
r
The French-Canadian's lack of interest and participation in
\ ' '
Quebec's economyjdates back to the events surrounding the British 
conquest. The English-Canadians took charge of Canada's commercial 
enterprises through acquiescence and default by the French. Therefore, 
when (^ ig business and industry came to Quebec they were usually owned 
and managed by English-Canadians or controlled by English-Canadian 
and United States investors.)
Urbanization and industrialization created a new middle class 
in Quebec, especially in the Montreal area. The new middle class 
received a nan-traditional education, urban living weakened their 
traditional "rural spirit," and |their working environment placed them 
in contact with the English-Canadian which prpvided an opportunity 
for comparing social-economic status.^ The new middle class, without 
the involvement of the Church in its traditional role as mediator
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between the government and the individual# was able to look directly 
at Duplessis's government as the source of the French-Canadian's 
social ills.
These conditions created a state of social unrest. The 
combination of these conditions served to break down traditional 
behavior patterns and prepared the individuals, and especially the 
new middle class, for changed definitions of the situation. Social 
change is the most important aspect, at this point, of the process 
of an emerging social movement. Social change creates the conditions 
for social unrest and prepares the individuals or groups for collec­
tive responses. However, social unrest does not necessarily lead 
to large scale or visible collective responses; it may just dissipate 
without any consequences. The World War I conscription crisis is an 
excellent example of this. Even though the conscription crisis 
involved visible behavior such as rioting and disorder, this behavior 
was not transformed into large-scale discontent nor was the behavior 
continuing •
Events and the Collective Processes
Social, unrest is transformed into discontent and collective 
responses by leaders, who provide new definitions of the situation, 
and events which provide new situations requiring new definitions 
and collective responses. An agitator or charismatic leader is the 
most effective type of leader to identify social causes that condition 
individuals and groups to redefine their traditional values and 
respond collectively. The timing and nature of an event are the
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critical aspects conducive to the formation of new definitions and 
the transformation of behavior into collective responses* [  The force 
of significant events played an important and necessary role in the 
emergence of the separatist movement*J(The death of Duplessis) was 
seen by the new middle class as a new gained freedomf a release from 
an oppressor# which caused them to redefine many of their traditional 
values* His death also paused the new middle class to shift their
attention to English-Canadian and foreign investors as the oppressors
)of the French-Canadians )and the ‘’villains” (of the movement //The
de Gaulle visit^ although short-lived as a rallying point, provided a 
model for the ’’French” and gave separatism international publicity^
The emerging African and Asian nations provided examples of anti­
colonial and independence movements. The FLQ did not have a large 
following, but its revolutionary tactics kept the notion of separatism 
in the forefront as a constant reminder to the French-Canadian of 
his social ills. ^The crises during 1970 (the election and the kid­
nappings) required new and critical definitions to be made concerning 
the separatist movement* These events, spontaneous and long-term, 
provided situations requiring definitions that questioned the tradi­
tional value system. ))
Social movements emerge out of discontent for conditions 
created by social change. Social change can explain the conditions 
but the collective processes that break down traditional behavior 
patterns and bring about changed definitions of the situation that 
lead to collective responses and the emergence of social movements
are within the domain of collective behavior.
60
Why It Failed
The following assessment of the separatist movement deals 
with the significant aspects of the movement which contributed to 
its failure to gain and maintain momentum during the 1970*s.
Leadership
What little leadership the movement had failed to support 
the, separatist cause during a very critical phase of the movement 
(the 1970 crises, the election and the October kidnappings). Rene 
Levesque, the leader of the Parti Quebecois, was a strong political 
leader, but he was not a "true believer." His commitment to demo­
cratic means limited his alternatives, thus hampering his flexibility 
to act in the best interest of the movement after the separatists 
lost at the election polls. The FLQ leadership represented the other 
extreme. It consisted of terrorist leaders who were able to attract 
only an insignificant following. Their concentration on one particu­
lar form of strategy and tactics made the organization an "underground 
affair."
The man who came close to the role of a "true believer" was 
Marcel Ghaput. He drew attention with his book, Pourquois ,1e Suis 
Separatiste, and his fasting episodes to raise money for the 
separatist cause. He made an unsuccessful attempt at provincial 
politics since he dropped the separatist cause as an active pursuit.
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Ideology and Strategy
The separatist movement lacked mass support. The primary
cause of this was due to the various separatist organizations that
were demanding the French-Canadian#s allegiance. Except for a
common goal, separatism, the goals and ideology of the organization 
9
ran the entire spectrum of political extremes. The only effort
towards uniting was the formation of the Parti Quebecois (see
Chapter IV). Divergent ideologies and philosophies failed to present
a clear course of action required to solicit a mass following.
Therefore, when separatist feelings reached their apex in the late
1960's and during the April 1970 provincial elections, a united
front for separatism could not be achieved. The Parti Quebecois*
failure to acquire sufficient National Assembly seats as a result of
the election disillusioned the previously democratically oriented
following and caused a temporary return to the support of street
violence as a means of achieving its goals. The philosophy, ideology,
and strategy of the separatist organizations fit into two general
categories— the democratic route to Quebec independence, the Parti
Quebecois, and the authoritarian approach.through terrorist and
guerrilla organizations like the FLQ. These two opposite forms are
similar in concept to the Langs* (I96I1 I87-I89) description of the
formation of the "gang" and the "sect" out of sectarian associations
which could apply in this case to account for the opposite directions
taken by the Parti Quebecois and organizations like the FLQ.
• • • the radical break on the part of the sectarian takes many 
forms. These may crystallize in two generally opposite 
directions. One culminates in the formation of a "gang"; the
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other in the "sect/’
• ••the interests of the gang are not only worldly but con­
cerned with the here and now. The gang has no futuristic 
illusions and, in fact* often avoids concern with anything 
but the immediate present;,,.
As far as gang formation is concerned, vague dissatisfactions 
on the part of its members coalesce into a code of active 
warfare against official norms.
In this case, the "gang" represents the terrorist and guerrilla
organizations and the Parti Quebecois represents the form of the
"sect," The characteristics of the gang match.the activities of the
FLQ described in Chapter IV. Their operations are planned against
the norms of society, especially against anything connected with the
English-Canadians and foreign interests.
The protest of the religious sect is against prevailing in­
stitutions as corruptions of a divine order. The sectarian 
code seeks to substitute positive rigor where laxness and 
compromise are the custom (Lang and Lang, I96I1 188-189)*
Whereas, in the case of the Parti Quebecois, political 
could be substituted for religious in reference to sect, the charac­
teristics of the sect would apply to the Parti Quebecois. The Parti 
Quebecois* fight is against the controlling interest the English- 
Canadians and foreigners have in Quebec's economic institution. The 
protest of the Parti Quebecois is against the English-Canadians as 
corrupters of the French-Canadian way of life.
The French-Canadian Perspective
To understand the loss of momentum experienced by the 
separatist movement, it is necessary to put into perspective the 
events that created the enthusiasm for separatism and the events 
that brought about its sudden decline.
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During the deca.de of the 1960's, French-Ganadian separatists 
perceived FLQ tactics as being in the name of the French-Canadians.
The work of the FLQ was being gradually accepted as a means of 
eliminating foreign control of Quebec's economy and a means of 
expressing French-Canadian discontent for English-Canadian domination. 
As long as the English-Canadians and foreign interests were the 
targets, no serious demonstrations were made against the FLQ's 
tactics. This was the situation when de Gaulle visited Quebec in 
1967.
Separatism received a boon from de Gaulle's visit to Quebec 
in 1967, a significant event that caused the French-Canadians to 
crystallize their definitions concerning the separatist movement.
De Gaulle was an idol to the French separatist. De Gaulle, the repre­
sentative of "French," visited Quebec— not Canada— and through words 
and actions, "blessed" the separatist movement. Not only did this 
event signify a tremendous rallying point for the movement, but(it 
forced the separatist issue to the front burner and into the inter­
national political arena. It forced Canada's and Quebec's political 
leaders to show their hand and to take a stand on separatism. The 
significance of events in determining responses to a social, movement 
is stated by the Langs (I96I1 51*0*
A social movement is carried by the amount of enthusiasm 
and support it attracts among a wider public. Support for 
its objective depends on many specific and unique circum­
stances and not just on broad social changes. Specific 
events shape the collective definition of a movement.
The enthusiasm created by de Gaulle's visit did not last 
long. After an unsuccessful attempt for a separatist victory through
the democratic process (the defeat of the Parti Quebecois in the 
April 1970 elections), the discontent turned to a more violent form 
that culminated in the kidnappings of LaPorte and Cross in October 
1970* Just as the de Gaulle event generated enthusiasm for 
separatism, the October 1970 events generated a "shock effect" that 
cancelled out support and mitigated enthusiasm for the movement.
Both of these events brought about a collective definition of the 
situation, the difference being they were on opposite ends of the 
spectrum*. The October crises brought about a decline in support 
for the violent methods of the FLQ. The Parti Quebecois lost support 
because immediately after the October crises any form of separatism 
meant an approval of violence and terrorism.
Implications of This Study
Since the 1970 crises, the separatist movement has been 
dormant. During the 1960's, the separatist movement had all the 
characteristics of a dynamic social movement. However, during 1970, 
the movement failed to gain the momentum necessary to realize its 
objective because of two key aspects: the French-Canadian*s rejection
of the violence by the separatist revolutionary groups (a common 
reaction of -a democratic society); and a signifleant lack of opposi­
tion to separatist demands from the Canadian government and the English- 
Canadians. This study indicates that the separatist movement w5H 
re-emerge with its main effort directed at achieving French-Canadian 
independence through the separatist legitimate political party, Parti
Quebecois, rather than through the separatist revolutionary groups.
The re-emergence of the separatist movement will be brought 
on by a critical event or events similar in nature to the events 
that were significant to the emergence of the movement during the 
I960*s. An event with the potential of giving rise to the separatist 
issue is the proposed revision of the Canadian constitution. This 
act would provide the opportunity for Quebec to cause its political 
status within the confederation to be modified or gain complete 
sovereignty. However, the driving force that will cause future 
events to be a significant happening for the separatist movement 
and keep the movement going will be a growing anti-French backlash 
(the necessary opposition that was absent during the earlier phase 
of the movement)•
A growing anti-French backlash will give separatism the 
necessary opposition to bring about the degree of conflict that 
could thrust the movement into a type of revolutionary warfare. 
However, a full blown revolutionary movement in Quebec appears to be 
highly unlikely. This is based on the* key role violence played in 
the previous failure of the movement, and the separatists' desire 
to preserve the present governmental structure and not to destroy 
it by a revolution. However, short-termed violence, normally associ­
ated with elementary collective behavior, will be present in a 
"nonviolent" separatist movement as it is in all social movements.
The most likely course for separatism is that it will re- 
emerge as a social movement. It is possible that separatism may
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remain in its present "status quo" existence as long as the 
Canadian government continues to acquiesce to Quebec's demands for 
more autonomy in provincial affairs. However, in face of a growing 
anti-French backlash, the status quo alternative for separatism 
appears to be a very remote possibility*
A logical consequence of this new form of opposition 
(anti-French backlash) is that it will force both the English and 
French-Canadians to pursue the separatist issue to its conclusion* 
This may cause Canada to grant Quebec independence with an associate 
status within the confederation. The probable forces behind Canada's
decision are: the potential for violence present in the separatist
\
movement; efforts by both the English and French-Canadians to avoid 
violence; and the desire of most of the separatist leaders to main­
tain a degree of social and economic ties with the rest of Canada 
after its independence. An associate status will give Quebec 
political independence, a common currency with Canada, and an 
economic status similar to a type of "common market" with Canada end 
the United States.
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